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RECENT DECISIONS
to include the unborn child within that group whose possible injury
can be reasonably foreseen.35
Having granted the child redress for prenatal injuries, a cause
of action for its wrongful death 6 would seem to follow, since the
denial of that action was based on the denial of the child's recovery
in its own name. 7 The instant case, however, did not concern a
wrongful death action; but sufficiently justified its place in legal
annals by overthrowing the throttling grip of precedent and afford-
ing partial justice to children negligently injured before birth.
x
TORTS-RIGHT OF UNEMANCIPATED MINOR TO SUE PARENT IN
BUSINESS CAPACITY.- Plaintiff, an unemancipated minor, sought
damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligent main-
tenance of a gasoline pump. The defendant, a partnership composed
of plaintiff's father and another, moved for judgment on the plead-
ings, contending that a minor child could not sue a firm in which his
parent was a partner. Held, motion denied. An unemancipated in-
fant can sue its parent in his business capacity for damages for per-
sonal injuries caused by negligence. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St.
566, 103 N. E. 2d 743 (1952).
The common law rule, followed by the majority of American
jurisdictions, denies the minor child a cause of action in tort against
its parent.' The rationale is that allowing such suits will disrupt the
family harmony,2 impair parental discipline,3 and deplete the family
exchequer.4
35 See Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N. Y. 198, 199 N. E. 56 (1935);
Palsgraf v. Long Island R R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).36 N. Y. DECEDENT EsTATE LAW § 130. But see Laws of N. Y. 1847, c.
450 (the 1847 statute refers to "person," while the present one applies to a
"decedent").
3 In re Roberts' Estate, 158 Misc. 698, 286 N. Y. Supp. 476 (Surr. Ct.
1936); see 16 Am. Jur. 56 (1938); 25 C. J. S. 1087, 1091, 1093 (1941). But
cf. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. 1933) ; Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio
St. 529, 92 N. E. 2d 809 (1950); see 1935 REI'oRTr, N. Y. LAW REvIsior
ComiIsSl Io 449, 471, 473; Cason, supra note 23, at 212.
"Accord, Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N. E. 2d 236 (1942) ; see
Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 110, 22 N. E. 2d 254, 256 (1939); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445, 453 (1950) ; Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278,
95 N. W. 640, 642 (1903); see MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PEr.soNs
AND Do~mEsnc RELATIoNs 449 (1931).2 Accord, Krohngold v. Krohngold, 181 N. E. 910 (Ohio App. 1932) ; see
Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S. E. 708, 710 (1932); Canen v. Kraft,
41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N. E. 277, 278 (1931).8 See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S. E. 426, 432 (1938) ; see
PROssEa, LAW OF ToRTs 906 (1941).
4 Accord, Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 15 (1923);
Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927) ; see McCurdy, Torts Be-
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When the infant is injured by the wilful tort of the parent so as
to render the latter punishable under criminal law, 5 some jurisdictions
allow the child to recover in tort against the parent.0 In such cases.
the reason for the parental immunity, preservation of domestic tran-
quillity and order, has already vanished-cessante ratione, cessat et
ipsa lex.
7
In the early decisions allowing recovery to a child injured
through negligence, the defendant-parent was protected by liability
insurance.8 The parent, therefore, did not actually suffer from an
adverse judgment, and the family treasury was the better for the
suit.9 In those cases the courts were influenced to relax the immunity
rule because of the presence of liability insurance; 10 but later the
tween Persons in Domiestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1072 et seq.
(1930) ; 36 IoWA L. REv. 384 (1951). Frequently the denial of such a cause of
action is based upon "public policy" motives, which include more than preserva-
tion of family harmony, discipline and assets. Accord, Krohngold v. Krohn-
gold, 181 N. E. 910 (Ohio App. 1932); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn.
388, 77 S. W. 664 (1903); cf. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445,
453 (1950) ; Duffy v. Duffy, 117 Pa. Super. 500, 178 AtI. 165 (1935) ; Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); see Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga.
App. 1, 163 S. E. 708, 710 (1932) ; Rines v. Rines, 97 N. H. 55, 80 A. 2d 497,
498 (1951) ; Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 429, 40 N. E. 2d 236, 238 (1942).
5 See N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 246, 483, 1054, 2010; MADDEN, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 446, 448.
6Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. 2d 923 (Md. 1951); Cowgill v. Boock, 189
Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950); cf. Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App.
206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901); Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133
(1913); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (1903); see Bulloch
v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S. E. 708, 711 (1932) ; Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196
Misc. 551, 554, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595, 597 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div.
972, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 620 (2d Dep't 1950) ; see McCurdy, supra note 4, at 1060.
Contra: McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664 (1903); Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
7 2 BL Comm. *391. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445, 453
(1950); see Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 AtI. 905, 910 (1930).
8 PROssER, LAW OF TORTS 907-908 (1941); see Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H.
352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930) ; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 254
(1939) ; Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d 343 (1939) ; Lusk v. Lusk,
113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932); MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 450.
9 "Such a suit does not, in fact, tend to disrupt the family relation nor
break down parental discipline, so that to that extent the reason for the general
rule fails." MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 450; accord, Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932) ; cf. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E.
2d 343 (1939). Great care should be given to this type of suit, since it could
be a fraudulent attempt to mulct the insurer. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d
677, 679 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
10 ".. . the essential fact which establishes the suability of the father is
that he has provided for satisfying the judgment in some way which removes
the suit from the class promotive of family discord." Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N. H. 352, 150 AtI. 905, 913 (1930); see Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 113,
22 N. E. 2d 254, 257 (1939). But cf. Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18,
152 At. 498 (1930); Lund v. Olsen, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N. W. 188 (1931);
Goheen v. Goheen, 9 N. J. Misc. 507, 154 Atl. 393 (1931) ; Canen v. Kraft, 41
Ohio App. 120, 180 N. E. 277 (1931); Fidelity Say. Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis.
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immunity rule itself was criticized " because of the change in the
economic status of the home. When Hewellette v. George ' 2 enun-
ciated the parental immunity rule for the first time in the United
States, the home was the place where the entire family lived, worked
and played; today, unfortunately, it is fast becoming a mere tem-
porary roost for eating and sleeping.
Some courts have said that suits between child and parent tend
to disrupt the family.13 Nevertheless, a child may sue its parent in
order to protect a property right; 14 and one child may bring a tort
action against his brother or sister. 15 These suits are allowed because
the courts find no precedent denying recovery; 16 but such litigation
would seem to injure the very domestic tranquillity which so influences
the courts in the case of a parent's negligent injuries to his child.17
602, 32 N. W. 2d 613 (1948); see Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383,
57 A. 2d 426, 428 (1948).
"1 "There never has been a common-law rule that a child could not sue its
parent. It is a misapprehension of the situation to start with that idea and to
treat the suits which have been allowed as exceptions to a general rule. The
minor has the same right to redress for wrongs as any other individual."
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 At. 905, 906 (1930); see PRossaa, LAw
OF TORTS 905-906 (1941).
12 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (P, an unemancipated minor, was wrongly
committed to an insane asylum by her deceased mother. P sued the mother's
executor for damages sustained. The trial court erroneously refused to allow
the jury to consider, as a basis for damages, anything beyond P's actual ex-
penses in getting out of the asylum. The Supreme Court of Mississippi there-
fore reversed. The question of P's right to sue, apparently not in issue in the
appeal, was questioned by the court, and assigned as the reason for the court's
refusal to reinstate an earlier verdict for P.).
13 See note 2 swpra; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 At. 905, 912(1930) ("As often stated before, the sole debatable excuse advanced for the
denial of the child's right to sue is the effect a suit would have upon discipline
and family life. If, therefore, the situation is such that the suit will not affect
these matters at all, the reason for the theory fails, and it should not be
applied."). In the normal family the child would not sue the parent; where
such litigation is brought, it would seem to be the effect of existing family
discord, and not a possible cause of disturbances. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio
St. 566, 103 N. E. 2d 743, 748 (1952).
14 See Wells v. Wells, 48 S. W. 2d 109, 111 (Mo. App. 1932); Minkin v.
Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A. 2d 461, 465 (1939).
15 "The general rule is that actions between sisters and brothers, even though
minors, may be maintained in law; considerations of public policy do not abate
such actions as in the case of a suit brought by a parent against his minor
child." Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A. 2d 426, 429 (1948);
accord, Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 254 (1939); Munsert
v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N. W. 671 (1938).
16 See note 13 supra; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 114, 22 N. E. 2d 254,
258 (1939) ("Even though the past furnishes no current declaration of the
right to maintain such an action, neither reason nor logic dictates that it must
be held that no such cause of action exists.").
17 See note 4 supra; see Wells v. Wells, 48 S. W. 2d 109, 111 (Mo. App.
1932).
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The only apparent reason for the immunity rule is precedent, and
the precedent in this country is questionable.' 8
Courts are faced with a choice: either to continue to enforce a
common law doctrine of dubious ancestry ' 9 under the drastically
changed circumstances of present day life; 20 or to recognize the rights
of the child by allowing it a cause of action against its parents.2 1
The preferable choice would appear to be to modify the parental
immunity rule by restricting it to the home; 22 and by permitting
recovery in cases where the injury was negligently inflicted by a




publishes a pictorial magazine of nation-wide circulation, displaying
on its cover the registered trade mark "Life" in white block letters
on a red background. In 1947 defendant opened a mail order busi-
ness developing color film, and advertised in photography magazines
under the name of "Life Color Labs." Defendant's title was in black
and white, with the word "Life" given the same prominence as the
other words. Plaintiff sought an injunction and an accounting. Al-
though the parties were not engaged in competing businesses, and it
was unlikely that their products would be confused, Special Term
granted the injunction.i Held, reversed. An injunction will not
18 See note 12 supra. The Mississippi court, which established the prece-
dent for the rule in the United States, either failed or was unable to cite any
sound authority for its position denying suits against parents. The necessity
of the court's statement of the "rule" is also debatable.
19 Ibid.
20 See text at note 12 supra. But see Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425,
430, 40 N. E. 2d 236, 238 (1942).
21 See note 8 supra. But cf. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N. E. 2d
236 (1942); Bcehm v. C. M. Gridley & Sons, 187 Misc. 113, 63 N. Y. S. 2d
587 (Sup. Ct. 1946); cf. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887
(1891).
22"Since parental discipline and control and the conduct of the domestic
establishment are at the root of the denial of a cause of action, it would seem
that the denial should at least, be so confined.. ." McCurdy, supra note 4,
at 1080. Cf. Foy v. Noy Electric Co., 231 N. C. 161, 56 S. E. 2d 418 (1949) ;
Wright v. Wright, 229 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 2d 540 (1948) ; Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950). But cf. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y.
425, 40 N. E. 2d 236 (1942) ; Thickman v. Thickman, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 284 (Sup.
Ct. 1949). The word "home" could be restricted to include only the actual
physical dimensions of the domicile, or such activities as the members of the
family engage in as a cohesive unit, e.g., a Sunday picnic.
23 Cf. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930) ; Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d 343 (1939) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166
S. E. 538 (1932).
'Time, Inc. v. Life Color Laboratory, 198 Misc. 1038, 101 N. Y. S. 2d
586 (Sup. Ct. 1950). The court denied the accounting, there having been no
proof of injury or damage to plaintiff.
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